A Clear-Eyed Look at What the War Has Achieved — and What It Has Not A straightforward assessment weighs Russia’s battlefield gains against major geopolitical setbacks and what that means for future peace negotiations As talk of peace negotiations re-emerges, a basic question is resurfacing: is Russia winning the war in Ukraine? Many assume that because Russia controls territory, it must be in a strong position. But “winning” depends entirely on what Russia actually hoped to achieve.
Moscow has given different explanations for the invasion — from stopping NATO, to defending ethnic Russians, to “reuniting” historic lands, to resisting Western influence. So instead of looking at the war emotionally or through propaganda, a better approach is simple: judge Russia’s results against the goals it may have been pursuing. What follows is a clear, non-technical assessment of four possible objectives and whether Russia has advanced or undermined them.
For decades, Russia has argued that NATO expanding eastwards threatens its security. One of the invasion’s key justifications was that Ukraine needed to be forced back into neutrality so the Western military alliance would not end up at Russia’s doorstep. If that was the goal, it has backfired spectacularly.
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Finland and Sweden — both historically neutral — joined NATO because of the invasion. European military spending has jumped, especially in Germany, which reversed 70 years of military restraint. The US now has more, not fewer, troops in Europe.
Ukraine itself is now tightly embedded in NATO training, intelligence and weapons systems, even if not formally a member. Clearly Russia is not winning here. If anything, NATO is bigger, richer, closer and more united than at any time since the Cold War.
President Putin has long claimed that Ukraine and Russia are “one people” and that Ukraine’s independence is an artificial Western project. Under this view, the war was meant to return Ukraine to Russia’s orbit. The opposite has happened.Ukrainian national identity has hardened to its strongest point in modern history.
Areas that previously felt closer to Russia — particularly the east and south — have turned away after experiencing occupation. The Ukrainian state is now more legitimate internationally, with EU candidate status and record diplomatic support. Even if Russia holds land, it has lost the hearts and minds of the Ukrainian population for at least a generation.
Strategically, Russia has damaged its ability to ever influence Ukrainian politics again. It has lost far more than it has gained. Russia often claims humanitarian motives: defending ethnic Russians from alleged persecution.
This narrative has been used since Crimea in 2014 and again in 2022. On the surface, Russia now controls large parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and part of Kherson — areas where many people historically speak Russian. But there are uncomfortable contradictions: Russian-speaking cities like Mariupol and Severodonetsk were destroyed largely by Russian bombardment.
There have been reports of forced passports, deportations and filtration camps — actions that undermine the claim of “protection.” Many civilians who once felt culturally close to Russia now feel betrayed.Territorial gains, yes. But the humanitarian justification has collapsed. Russia may control land, but it has lost trust and legitimacy among the very people it claims to defend.
Russia sees the European Union not just as a trade bloc, but as a political model that spreads democratic norms and legal standards. Countries moving toward the EU generally move away from Moscow’s influence. Again, Russia’s actions have accelerated what it hoped to stop: Ukraine and Moldova were granted EU candidate status at record speed.
Georgia’s public opinion has swung strongly toward Europe and away from Russia. The EU has become more unified, especially regarding energy, sanctions and foreign policy. Russia is losing strategically.
Europe is more cohesive and more determined than before. Beyond the political goals, Russia may have had narrower motives: securing a land bridge to Crimea, controlling strategic industries, natural resources or gaining leverage over the Black Sea region. Here, Russia has had mixed results.
It holds significant areas and has fortified them heavily. But these gains come with high costs: maintaining occupation forces, rebuilding damaged infrastructure, and facing long-term insurgency risks. Territory alone does not guarantee real power.
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