This opinion article critically interrogates the Zimbabwean government’s rural urbanisation policy in light of pervasive challenges in spatial governance, including informal resettlement, land baronism, and unregulated urban sprawl. It contends that Zimbabwe is facing a structural collapse in land-use planning driven by systemic corruption, weak regulatory oversight, and the political instrumentalisation of land.
While rural-urban integration is framed by the state as a development tool, the empirical outcomes point to increasing disorder, land tenure insecurity, and collapsing service infrastructure.
Drawing on historical land reforms and contemporary spatial policies, this opinion article argues for a radical overhaul in Zimbabwe’s urban planning architecture, anchored in enforceable legal frameworks, transparent land allocation, and a rethinking of the rural-urban dichotomy in development discourse.
The post-colonial state in Zimbabwe has long grappled with the spatial legacies of settler colonialism, wherein land ownership and settlement patterns were racially and economically skewed. Following the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of the early 2000s, the country entered a new phase in land redistribution, but one that remains marred by irregularities and political expedience.
Recent policy rhetoric, notably the state’s rural urbanisation thrust, seeks to reconfigure rural economies and infrastructure.
However, this vision is unfolding against a backdrop of unregulated resettlement schemes, corruption-riddled land allocations, the rise of informal land markets, and unmitigated urban migration. These dynamics have rendered both rural and urban environments increasingly unliveable, exacerbating poverty, service delivery deficits, and environmental degradation.
The Zimbabwean government has promoted rural urbanisation as a strategic objective within its Vision 2030 agenda, positing that modernising rural centres can reduce urban congestion, stimulate local economies, and retain labour in rural areas. In theory, this form of decentralised development is commendable; however, in practice, it suffers from conceptual ambiguity and poor execution.
Rural urbanisation in Zimbabwe is not unfolding as a planned transition from agricultural villages to functional small towns.
Instead, it is manifesting as the mushrooming of peri-urban and rural settlements that mimic urban forms without the foundational infrastructure, governance, or economic base. These so-called “growth points” are often hastily planned or entirely unplanned, lacking piped water, sewage systems, proper roads, or schools. The result is a replication of urban poverty in rural spaces — a phenomenon scholars term “rurbanisation” without industrialisation.
Central to Zimbabwe’s spatial crisis is the rampant politicisation and commodification of land allocation.
Local authorities, rural district councils, and politically connected elites have become the new gatekeepers of land, operating with minimal accountability. The emergence of “land barons” — private individuals or syndicates who illegally parcel out state or communal land for profit — has become a defining feature of Zimbabwe’s urban geography.
Many high-density suburbs, such as Chitungwiza, Epworth, and parts of Harare South, are littered with housing developments built on improperly allocated land, often on wetlands, school sites, or utility corridors. These illegal settlements are not merely tolerated but actively facilitated by collusion between local officials, housing cooperatives, and ruling party operatives.
What was once a state-led process of planned urban expansion has been overtaken by rent-seeking behaviour and patronage networks, where access to land is a currency of political loyalty rather than a constitutional right.
The FTLRP was meant to redress colonial injustices and democratise access to land. Yet, two decades later, its outcomes remain contradictory. While millions of hectares were redistributed, the absence of formalised tenure, cadastral mapping, and infrastructural investment means that many resettlement areas are structurally disconnected from national development planning.
Resettled farmers — often grouped in “A1” (smallholder) or “A2” (commercial) schemes — face significant challenges.
Most lack title deeds, making it difficult to invest in infrastructure or access credit. Moreover, overlapping claims, unclear boundaries, and disputes over original vs. resettled populations have led to legal uncertainty and occasional violence.
These unresolved land reform challenges feed directly into the crisis of rural urbanisation, as displaced or landless populations move toward cities in search of stability, exacerbating urban pressure.
Zimbabwe’s urban population continues to grow despite high unemployment rates and poor public services. Cities like Harare and Bulawayo were never designed to accommodate such demographic expansion, particularly in the post-2000s era. Rural push factors — including climate change, declining agricultural returns, and land disputes — have intensified migration.
Yet urban local authorities lack the fiscal capacity or institutional autonomy to respond.
Central government interference, especially through politically appointed “commissions” that replace elected councils, further erodes planning capacity. The result is a proliferation of informal settlements, illegal structures, uncollected waste, intermittent water supply, and overloaded health and education systems.
Ironically, government rhetoric of rural urbanisation has not stemmed the tide of rural-urban migration. Instead, it has created a chaotic hybrid of under-serviced urban and rural settlements, none of which function effectively as engines of growth.
Land and settlement policies in Zimbabwe are deeply political.
Access to land is both an economic asset and a mechanism of political control. The ruling party has repeatedly used land allocations — particularly ahead of elections — to reward supporters, pacify disgruntled youth, or undermine opposition-led municipalities. In this context, rational spatial planning becomes secondary to the imperatives of political expediency.
Source: Thezimbabwemail
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